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Abstract
Price rigidity is the key mechanism for propagating business cycles in traditional Keynesian
theory. Yet the New Keynesian literature has failed to show that sticky prices by themselves
can e⁄ectively propagate business cycles in general equilibrium. We show that price rigidity in
fact can (by itself) give rise to a strong propagation mechanism of the business cycle in standard
New Keynesian models, provided that investment is also subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
In particular, we show that reasonable price stickiness can generate highly persistent, hump-
shaped movements in output, investment and employment in response to either monetary or
non-monetary shocks, even if investment is only partially cash-in-advance constrained. Hence,
whether or not price rigidity is responsible for output persistence (and the business cycle in
general) may not be a theoretical question, but an empirical one.
Keywords: Business Cycle; Money; Sticky Prices; Output Persistence; New-Keynesian Mod-
els; Cash-in-Advance; Money-in-Utility; Financing Constraints and Investment.
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11 Introduction
Sticky prices are the key mechanism assumed in traditional Keynesian theory for propagating the
impact of monetary shocks as well as other aggregate shocks throughout the economy. Yet to
demonstrate a persistent output e⁄ect of sticky prices in a fully-speci￿ed new Keynesian dynamic-
general-equilibrium model has proven to be very di¢ cult, as recently stressed by Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (CKM 2000). CKM show that empirically plausible degree of price rigidity generates
only a modest degree of output persistence in responding to monetary shocks, far from enough to
account for the estimated output persistence in the U.S. economy. The usefulness of the sticky
price assumption, one of the corner stones in traditional Keynesian business cycle theory, is thus
under a serious challenge.1
The persistence problem raised by CKM (2000) along with others has led researchers to explore
other types of rigidities or economic forces, in conjunction with sticky prices, to explain the persis-
tent e⁄ects of monetary shocks. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005) obtain more
persistent output responses to monetary shock by combining both sticky prices and sticky wages on
the nominal side, aided by habit formation, adjustment costs, limited participation in money market
and variable capital utilization on the real side. In a model without capital, Jeanne (1998) shows
that adding real-wage rigidity into sticky price models can signi￿cantly increase the propagation of
monetary shocks in output. Dotsey and King (2001) show that output persistence can be increased
by features such as a more important role for produced inputs, variable capacity utilization, and
labor supply variability through changes in employment. These elements together can reduce the
elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output, improving the persistence of output. Bergin and
Feenstra (2000) emphasize interactions between input-output production structures and translog
preferences to increase output persistence under sticky prices. Similar results based on production
chains can also be found in the work of Huang and Liu (2001). Other researchers such as Mankiw
and Reis (2002), Woodford (2001), Erceg and Levin (2003) have emphasized the important role of
imperfect-information in helping sticky prices to generate persistent output responses to monetary
shocks.2
By adding a large number of building blocks, such as real rigidities and complex information
1For a review of the New Keynesian literature, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). For empirical literature
on the persistent e⁄ects of monetary shocks, see Sims (1992), Christiano et al. (1995) and Strongin (1995), among
others.
2The literature has also explored the implications of sticky nominal wages for output persistence. Models based
on staggering wages such as those in Andersen (1998), Erceg (1997), and Huang and Liu (2001) are still not able
to generate su¢ cient degree of real persistence seen in data, though they do alleviate the problem to some extent.
Edge (2002) recently establishes conditions under which wage and price staggering are equivalent regarding their
e⁄ects on output persistence, thus the persistence problem is similar in both sticky-wage and sticky-price models.
Also see Dotsey and King (2005) for the recent new literature on state-dependent pricing in general equilibrium.
This literature shows that state-dependent pricing can have dramatically richer propagation mechanisms than time-
dependent pricing in generating output and in￿ ation persistence. Benhabib and Farmer (2000) show that externalities
can also give rise to output persistence in a monetary model.
2structures, into the standard sticky-price model can improve the model￿ s ￿t in terms of output
persistence, but at the expense of simplicity. Often more than one factors are added to entangle
with nominal rigidities such that it becomes hard to distinguish exactly which factor is doing what
in generating output persistence. In addition, while sticky or imperfect information proves to be
e⁄ective in giving rise to output persistence, the way they are modeled in the literature often uses
partial equilibrium framework. It is shown recently by Keen (2004), for example, that the business
cycle implications of sticky information proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) may not be robust
to general equilibrium extensions.3
This paper takes a step back and asks whether a canonical sticky price model without any
additional frictions or real rigidities can generate a reasonable degree of output persistence. Putting
it another way, this paper asks why sticky prices by themselves may fail to provide a strong
propagate mechanism for the business cycle. This is an intriguing question because intuitively
there is no reason price rigidity would not lead to output persistence, since it could turn i:i:d:
money shocks into serially correlated movements in the real balance just as e⁄ectively as any
types of real rigidities. Real balance in turn could a⁄ect aggregate spending and production. Yet
despite the exploding literature trying to overcome the persistence problem, what exactly fails
the Keynesian sticky price propagation mechanism in general equilibrium models remains unclear.
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), for example, show the inability of sticky prices in generating
output persistence mainly via model simulations. The reasons behind the failure are less clearly
presented when capital is included.
We show in this paper that sticky prices can in fact by themselves generate highly persistent
output movements, contrary to the ￿ndings of the existing literature. In particular, we show
that empirically plausible degree of price stickiness can generate hump-shaped output responses
to monetary shocks in a way very similar to the data. Thus, sticky prices are certainly a useful
assumption in explaining the business cycle as far as theory is concerned. Whether they are in fact
responsible for the business cycles in the real world, however, is an empirical question.
The key to our ￿nding is a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on aggregate demand (consumption
plus investment). CIA constraints can signi￿cantly limit the initial increase in aggregate demand
after a money injection, in sharp contrast to the popular money-in-utility (MIU) speci￿cation,
because agents are forced to accumulate real balances before they can fully raise spending, leading
to more smoothed output responses. Consider a model without capital. Under a money-in-utility
(MIU) speci￿cation, demand for goods and demand for money are only loosely linked. Households
can therefore raise consumption signi￿cantly beyond the initial increase in money injection, in
anticipation of future money increases, leading to volatile impulse responses in output. But a
3Erceg and Levin (2003) is an exception.
3CIA constraint limits the rise in consumption to the current rise in money, forcing households
to wait until future money injections to fully raise consumption. Hence, CIA can lead to hump-
shaped output persistence under serially correlated money shocks while MIU cannot. When there
is capital in the model, if both consumption and investment are subject to CIA constraints (there
is no equivalent form of this speci￿cation to a MIU speci￿cation), the increase in aggregate demand
is again limited to the current rise in money, giving rise to more smoothed, hump-shaped output
responses to shocks.
In addition, with CIA constraint on aggregate spending (consumption plus investment), sticky
prices can lead to hump-shaped output persistence not only under monetary shocks, but also under
non-monetary shocks, such as technology shocks and preference shocks. The intuition is similar:
cash-in-advance postpones the maximum impact of shocks on aggregate demand because agents
are forced to intertemporally smooth aggregate spending via real balance accumulation over time.
A smoothed aggregate demand thus dictates a smoothed aggregate supply (production).4
The key assumption driving our results is that investment must be subject to a CIA constraint.
Given the availability of complicated ￿nancial markets, this seems an di¢ cult assumption to defend.
However, this assumption may be defended at least on three grounds. First, ￿rms￿investment
projects are often subject to ￿nancing constraints due to capital market imperfections (moral
hazard, asymmetric information, incomplete markets, and so on). Consequently, ￿rms￿internal
cash ￿ ows are often crucial in determining their investment level. A vast empirical literature in the
past twenty years has documented a strong link between ￿rms￿internal cash ￿ ow and investment.
This literature shows that such a close relationship is due to ￿nancial constraints rather than to
good performances in sales (see, most notably, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988).5
Second, the so called ￿money" in a standard CIA model can be understood in more general
terms as M1 or M2, rather than as just cash. Given that the broad money supply (M1 or M2) is
proportional to the monetary base (B) according to Mt = mBt, the above interpretation is valid as
long as the money multiplier (m) is relatively constant. Thus, a monetary shock in the model can
be reinterpreted as a shock to the availability of liquidity or credit in terms of M1 or M2; which is
4It is thus not surprising that our ￿ndings also contradict a branch of the existing literature that assumes CIA. For
example, Yun (1996) studies a CIA constrained sticky price model with capital and ￿nds that money shocks have no
persistent e⁄ects on output. Ellison and Scott (2000) use the same model and demonstrate that sticky prices not only
fail to produce persistent output ￿ uctuations but also generate extremely volatile output at very high frequencies.
This is because both papers assume CIA constraint on consumption only. When there is capital in the model,
intertemporal substitution between current consumption and future consumption can be achieved through capital
accumulation. In this case, imposing CIA constraint only on consumption spending is not e⁄ective for generating
persistent output, since investment becomes very volatile by serving as the bu⁄er for consumption, and consequently
investment will dictate output dynamics. Thus, even if consumption is hump-shaped, output is not. This suggests
that a CIA constraint on investment is crucial for generating output persistence, as consumption can always be
smoothed by capital accumulation.
5See Habbard (1998) for a comprehensive review of this large literature. Also see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(2000) for the recent debate on this issue.
4just as likely to a⁄ect ￿rms as to consumers.6
Third, the subjection of both consumption and investment to money is more consistent with the
estimation of aggregate money demand function. For example, Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin (1992)
￿nd that aggregate income is a better scale variable than aggregate consumption in estimating
money demand. Indeed, most empirical work in money demand estimation has adopted income
rather than consumption as a scale variable. Classical examples include Friedman (1959) and
Goldfeld (1973, 1976). This may explain why CIA constraints on both consumption and investment
are widely used in the theoretical monetary literature, such as Stockman (1981), Abel (1985) and
Fuerst (1992), to name just a few.
The above justi￿cations notwithstanding, we show that output continues to be hump-shaped
even when only as little as 30% of ￿rms￿investment is subject to CIA constraint in our model.
Therefore, theoretically speaking, sticky prices have no trouble generating output persistence as
long as investment is partially constrained by money holdings.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 demonstrates output persistence under
CIA in a simple model without capital. We show in this model that sticky prices can give rise to
hump-shaped output responses to money shocks under CIA, but not under MIU.7 Section 3 studies
a fully speci￿ed general equilibrium model with capital. It is shown that under either monetary
or non-monetary shocks, output exhibits hump-shaped persistence as long as a certain fraction of
investment is subject to money-in-advance constraint. Hence, introducing capital into the model
does not destroy the persistence mechanism of sticky prices, in contrast to CKM (2000). Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Households
A representative household chooses sequences of consumption, fCtg
1
t=0, labor supply, fNtg
1
t=0, and




￿j [logCt ￿ aNt]
6There is strong evidence that ￿rms hold a substantial fraction of money in the economy. Using data from the
Federal Reserve￿ s Demand Deposit Ownership Survey (DDOS), which separately reports the ownership of demand
deposits at commercial banks by ￿nancial ￿rms, non￿nancial ￿rms, households and foreigners, Mulligan (1997)
found that non￿nancial ￿rms hold at least 50% more demand deposits than do household. By the 1980s ￿rm had
accumulated almost twice as many demand deposits as household had. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve￿ s
Flow of Funds (FOF) reports that households may hold more M1 than ￿rms do, but Mulligan convincingly argued
that the DDOS data are more accurate than the FOF data.
7Jeanne (1998) shows that real wage rigidity must be introduced into a CIA model without capital in order to
generate persistence. Here we show that this is not necessary.
5subject to Ct + Mt
Pt ￿
Mt￿1+Xt
Pt + wtNt + ￿t and the CIA constraint, Ct ￿ Mt
Pt ; where X is money
injection, P is the aggregate goods price in terms of money, w is the real wage, and ￿ is the pro￿t
income contributed from ￿rms which the household owns. Since the current money holdings, Mt,
enter the CIA constraint, there is no in￿ ation tax on consumption. Hump-shaped output persistence
remains if the in￿ ation tax e⁄ect is allowed. Note that a linear leisure function is assumed for
simplicity. Making the leisure function nonlinear has little e⁄ect on the results. Denoting ￿1 and
￿2 as the Lagrangian multipliers for the budget constraint and the CIA constraint respectively, the
￿rst order conditions can be summarized by
1
Ct
= ￿1t + ￿2t (1)




￿1t+1 + ￿2t: (3)
2.2 Firms






￿￿1 ; where ￿ > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution among the intermediate
goods, y(i). Let pt(i) denote the price of intermediate goods i, the demand for intermediate goods





Yt; and the relationship between ￿nal goods price and intermediate





Each intermediate good i is produced by a single monopolistically competitive ￿rm according
to the following technology, yt(i) = nt(i): Intermediate good ￿rms face perfectly competitive factor
markets, and are hence price takers in the factor markets. Pro￿ts are distributed to household at
the end of each time period. The cost function for ￿rm i, can be derived from minimizing wtnt(i)
subject to nt(i) ￿ y: Denoting ￿t as the Lagrangian multiplier, which is also the real marginal cost,
the ￿rst order condition for cost minimization is given by wt = ￿t: Consequently, the real pro￿t in
period t is given by (
pt(i)
Pt ￿ ￿t)yt(i):
Following Calvo (1983) in assuming that each ￿rm has a probability of 1 ￿ ￿ to adjust its
monopoly price in each period, then a ￿rm￿ s intertemporal pro￿t maximization problem is to


















is the ratio of marginal utilities taken as exogenous by the ￿rm; and





















Because all ￿rms that can adjust their prices face the same problem, all monopolist ￿rms will set
their prices in the same way as indicated above. The average price of ￿rms that do not adjust prices
is simply last period￿ s price level, Pt￿1. Given that only a fraction of 1 ￿ ￿ can adjust their prices
in each period, the ￿nal good price index can then be written as Pt =
￿
￿P1￿￿





In equilibrium, household￿ s ￿rst order conditions and ￿rms￿pro￿t maximization conditions are
satis￿ed, all markets clear, and the CIA constraint binds. We study symmetric equilibrium only.
The model is solved by log-linearization around a zero-in￿ ation steady state. Using circum￿ ex
lower-case letters to denote percentage deviations around steady state, the log-linearized optimal
price and the price index are given respectively by ^ p￿




^ ￿t+s + ^ pt+s
￿
and ^ pt =
￿^ pt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)^ p￿
t, which together imply the New Keynesian Phillips relationship:
^ ￿t = ￿Et^ ￿t+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
^ ￿t; (6)
where ^ ￿t ￿ ^ pt ￿ ^ pt￿1 is the in￿ ation rate.
The log-linearized aggregate production function is given by ^ yt = ^ nt; hence around the steady
state the aggregate production function is the same as individual ￿rm￿ s production function. Notice
that the CIA constraint can be expressed as ^ yt ￿ ^ yt￿1 = xt ￿ ^ ￿t, where x ￿ log Xt
Mt￿1 denotes the
growth rate of nominal money stock. We assume that the monetary authority follows a money
growth rule given by xt = ￿xt￿1 + "t. The household￿ s ￿rst-order conditions are thus reduced to:
(2￿￿)^ yt ￿2^ ￿t = ￿￿(^ ￿t+1 + ^ ￿t+1): Substituting out ￿t in this equation and in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve using the CIA constraint, the system of equations for solving f^ yt; ^ ￿tg are given by:
xt + ^ yt￿1 ￿ (1 + ￿)^ yt = ￿Et (xt+1 ￿ ^ yt+1) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
^ ￿t; (7)
72^ yt ￿ 2^ ￿t = ￿^ yt+1 ￿ ￿xt+1 ￿ ￿^ ￿t+1; (8)

















































The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are given by: f 2
￿; 1
￿￿;￿;￿g. Note that the ￿rst two of the
eigenvalues are larger than unit, hence they can be utilized to solve the system forward to determine
f^ yt; ^ ￿tg as functions of the state f^ yt￿1;xtg. Clearly, the other two smaller roots, f￿;￿g; determine
the propagation mechanism of output. The decision rule of output takes the form: ^ yt = ￿^ yt￿1+￿xt;
where ￿ ￿
2￿(1￿￿￿)+￿￿(￿￿￿￿1+￿￿￿￿￿2)
(2￿￿￿)(1￿￿￿￿) < 1 is the elasticity of output with respect to money growth
shocks.8 Clearly, the persistence of output is determined jointly by the degree of price stickiness, ￿,
and the persistence of shocks. If monetary shocks follow an AR(1) process: xt = ￿xt￿1 + "t, then
output becomes an AR(2) process:
^ yt = (￿ + ￿)^ yt ￿ ￿￿^ yt￿1 + ￿"t; (10)
which implies a hump-shaped impulse response function. Suppose that the average price stickiness
is about four quarters in the economy, the probability of not adjusting prices is then ￿ = 0:75:
Given that money growth shocks have autocorrelation of ￿ = 0:6, as is commonly assumed in the
literature (e.g., CKM 2000),9 then the degree of output persistence implied by the model matches
the contract multiplier of the U.S. economy estimated by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000)
almost exactly. The maximum impact of a money injection on output is delayed for three quarters
after the shock. The simulated impulse responses of output are graphed in Figure 1 (top window).
8￿ > 0 if ￿ is large enough.
9Also see our calibration using post-war data in the next section.
8Fig. 1. Impulse Responses of Output to a Money Shock.
When money demand steps from MIU instead, under standard assumptions regarding the elas-
ticity of substitution between consumption and money, no hump-shaped output persistence can be











subject to Ct + Mt
Pt ￿
Mt￿1+Xt
Pt + wtNt + ￿t: Letting all parameters take the same values as in the
previous CIA model, the bottom panel in Figure 1 shows that output does not have hump-shaped
persistence.10
Technically speaking, the log-linearized ￿rst order conditions of the MIU model can be reduced
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10Again, the linear leisure function is assumed for simplicity. Making it nonlinear has little e⁄ect on the results.
CKM (2000) argue that perfect substitutability between consumption and leisure is crucial for generating output
persistence under the Taylor (1980) type of price rigidity. Here we ￿nd that this requirement is not necessary under
the Calvo (1983) type of price rigidity. See Kiley (2002) for discussions regarding the di⁄erences between the Taylor
type and the Calvo (1983) type of price rigidities.




(1￿￿￿)xt￿1: When xt is AR(1), we have
^ yt = (￿ + ￿)^ yt￿1 ￿ ￿￿^ xt￿1 +
￿(1 ￿ ￿2￿￿)





Notice that output is no longer an AR(2) process as in equation (10), but an ARMA(2;1) process.
The crucial di⁄erence this makes is that one of the autoregressive roots (the poles) and the moving
average root (the zeros) almost cancel each other in the MIU model, reducing the ARMA(2;1)
process in equation (12) to an AR(1) process. An AR(1) process cannot exhibit hump-shaped
dynamics. To see the pole-zero cancellation, let ￿ = 1.11 Equation (12) reduces to




This also explains why consumption (output) can be very volatile in MIU models due to the value
of ￿ typically assumed in the literature. For example, let ￿ = 0:75 and ￿ = 0:6, then consumption
will increase by 0:75
0:4 = 1:875 percent when money growth increases by just one percent. This is
consistent with the graph in the lower panel in Figure 1.
The intuition is that cash-in-advance prevents consumption from rising too much in the impact
period since agents are not able to increase consumption beyond the current cash injections. This
smooths demand and hence production. On the other hand, when consumption is not cash-in-
advance constrained (as in MIU models), households can raise consumption signi￿cantly beyond
the initial increase in money injection, in anticipation of future money increases. This mechanism
of output smoothing due to a CIA constraint on aggregate demand continues to work in more
general models with capital, as the following section shows.
3 The Full Model
3.1 Households
The representative household chooses consumption (C), hours (N), capital stock (K), money de-












11This near pole-zero cancellation will take place regardless the value of ￿. The reader can check this by setting
￿ = 0, for example.
10subject to




Mt￿1 + Bt￿1 + Xt
pt
+ rtKt + wtNt + ￿t (14)




where rt and wt denote real rental rate and real wage rate that prevail in competitive factor markets;
R denotes nominal returns to bonds, ￿ denotes the depreciation rate of capital. At the end of each
period, the household receives wages from hours worked, rental payments from capital lending, and
nominal bonds returns as well as pro￿ts ￿t from all ￿rms the household owns. If consumption is
the only cash goods, then our model reduces to that of Yun (1996) and Ellison and Scott (2000).12
Denoting the Lagrangian multipliers for (14) and (15) as ￿1 and ￿2 respectively, the ￿rst order
conditions with respect to fCt;Nt;Kt+1;Mt;Btg can be summarized by
￿t
Ct
= ￿1t + ￿2t (16)
aN
￿
t = ￿1twt (17)












The ￿nal good sector is the same as described previously. Hence the demand of intermediate goods










The production technology for intermediate good i is given by y(i) = Ak(i)￿n(i)1￿￿, where 0 <
￿ < 1 and A denotes aggregate technology shocks to productivity. The cost function of ￿rm i is
derived by minimizing rk(i) + wn(i) subject to Ak(i)￿n(i)1￿￿ ￿ y. The ￿rst order conditions are




n(i), where ￿ denotes the real marginal cost. Given the production
function, the real marginal cost can be written as
12An alternative speci￿cation of the model would be to impose CIA constraints on individual ￿rms￿investment
instead of on aggregate investment. However, doing so gives rise to a non-trivial aggregation problem under sticky












Note that, since the total cost equals ￿tyt(i), the marginal cost equals average cost. Let the
probability of price adjustment in each period for any intermediate ￿rm be 1 ￿ ￿, a ￿rm￿ s optimal



























3.3 Equilibrium and Calibration
In a symmetric equilibrium near the steady state, the aggregate production function can still be
expressed as Yt = AtK￿
t N1￿￿
t and the aggregate pro￿t is still given by ￿t = Yt ￿ wtNt ￿ rtKt:
Hence the equilibrium market clearing conditions and constraints are:
Ct + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt = Yt (23)
Mt = Mt￿1 + Xt (24)
Bt = Bt￿1 = 0 (25)








t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)P￿1￿￿
t
￿ 1
1￿￿ ; leads to the same relationship for the dynamics of in￿ ation
around the steady state as before: ^ ￿t = ￿Et^ ￿t+1 +
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿
^ ￿t; except that the marginal cost
function is now di⁄erent.









(2 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
: (28)
12Notice that, compared to a standard RBC model in which K
Y =
￿￿
1￿￿(1￿￿), there are two distortions
on the steady state capital-output ratio in the sticky price model. First, monopolistic competition
gives rise to a markup of
1￿￿
￿ % > 0, which approaches zero only if the elasticity of substitution
￿ ! 1 (i.e., ￿ ! 1). A positive markup implies a lower steady state capital-output ratio. Second,
due to the fact that money is needed to facilitate transactions, an in￿ ation tax is imposed on
investment returns, which lowers the steady state capital-output ratio by a factor of (2 ￿ ￿). If
￿ = 1, this e⁄ect disappears.13
The exogenous shocks are assumed to be othorgonal to each other and follow AR(1) processes
in log:
xt = ￿xxt￿1 + "xt
logAt = ￿A logAt￿1 + "At (29)
log￿t = ￿￿ log￿t￿1 + "￿t
where x ￿ log Xt
Mt￿1 denotes money growth rate. The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency. We
choose the time discounting factor ￿ = 0:99; the rate of capital depreciation ￿ = 0:025, the capital
elasticity of output ￿ = 0:3, the inverse labor supply elasticity ￿ = 0 (Hansen￿ s indivisible labor),
and the elasticity of substitution parameter ￿ = 10 (implying a markup of about 10%).14 The
price rigidity parameter ￿ is set to 0:75, and persistence parameters for technology and preference
shocks are set to ￿A = ￿￿ = 0;9: These parameter values are quite standard in the literature. To
calibrate money growth shocks, we estimate an AR(1) model for the growth rate of monetary base
(M0) in the U.S. (1950:1 - 2003:4), and we obtain ￿x = 0:6 and ￿"x = 0:006.
3.4 Model Evaluation
The impulse responses of output (Y ), consumption (C), investment (I) and employment (N) to a
one-standard-deviation shock to money growth are graphed in Figure 2. Several features are worth
noticing in Figure 2. First, a monetary growth shock can cause signi￿cant increases in economic
activity. On impact, investment increases by 2:6 percent and output increases by 0:56 percent,
while consumption increases by only 0:06 percent. The overall standard deviation of investment is
about four times that of output, and the overall standard deviation of consumption is about half
that of output. These di⁄erent magnitudes suggest that monetary shocks can explain one of the
most prominent business cycle facts emphasized by the real business cycle literature; namely, that
consumption is less volatile than output and that investment is more volatile than output.
13See Stockman (1981) for more discussions on this issue.
14The results are robust to the values of these parameters. For example, very similar results obtain even when the
markup is zero and when the utility function on leisure has the log form (i.e., ￿ = 0:25).
13Fig. 2. Impulse Responses to a Money Shock.
Second and most strikingly, the impulse responses of output (Y ), employment (N) and invest-
ment (I) are all hump-shaped, with a peak response reached around the third quarter after the
shock. This suggests a richer propagation mechanism of the model than a standard RBC model or
a sticky-price model with money-in-utility. This richer propagation mechanism induced by sticky
prices and the CIA constraint enables the model to match the observed output persistence in the
U.S. economy quite well. For example, if we estimate an AR(2) process for the logarithm of real
GDP of the United States (1950:1 - 2003:4) with a quadratic time trend, then the ￿tted equation
is
log(yt) = 1:3log(yt￿1) ￿ 0:37log(yt￿2) + vt; (30)
where the standard deviation of the residual is ￿v = 0:0088.15 Using this estimated standard
deviation to simulate the U.S. output by equation (30), Figure 3 (left window) shows that the
shape of the impulse response function of the U.S. output looks very much like that implied by the
model (where the standard deviation of money shock in the model is ￿"x = 0:006), except that the
volatility of the model output is only about one third of the data.
15CKM (2000) obtain similar estimates.
14Fig. 3. Output Dynamics of Model and Data.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) propose to measure the persistence of output by its half
life. When the half-life is measured starting from the initial response at impact period, the half-life
of output in the model is 10, while that in the data is 11. When it is measured starting from the
peak of the response after a shock, the half-life is 8 in the model and 9 in the data.
Ellision and Scott (2000) show that sticky price models cannot explain the business cycle since
sticky prices tend to generate too much variations in output at the high frequencies but not enough
variations at the business cycle frequencies. Here we show that this is not true if investment
spending is subject to cash-in-advance constraint. The right-hand side window in Figure 3 shows
that the power spectrum of output growth in the model matches that in the data quite closely in
terms of variance distribution across frequencies. However, in terms of total variance (proportional
to the area underneath the spectral density function), the model explains only about 16% of the
data.16
The intuition for the persistent output e⁄ect of sticky prices in the full model with capital
is similar to that in the basic model without capital. Cash-in-advance acts to smooth aggregate
spending across time; since by requiring cash, the maximum impact of shocks on demand (and hence
supply) is postponed until enough real balance is accumulated. Thus the CIA constraint serves
essentially like an intertemporal form of adjustment cost, which is well know for generating hump-
shaped output dynamics. However, if only consumption goods is subject to CIA, output cannot
16Introducing capacity utilization could improve the model in this regard.
15have enough persistence since shocks can immediately impact on investment spending, which will
dictates aggregate demand and supply, making output very volatile at the high frequencies (see,
e.g., Ellison and Scott, 2000).17
Since it is well known that investment is much more volatile than output in the data, to make
sure that a CIA constraint on investment does not lead to too little investment volatility relative to
output, Table 1 reports the standard business cycle statistics of the model. It shows that, among
other things, the model is able to explain the large volatility of investment relative to output despite
investment is subject to CIA constraint.
Table 1. Selected Moments
￿x=￿y cor(xt;yt) cor(xt;xt￿1)
x ct it nt ct it nt yt ct it nt
U.S. Data 0.53 3.36 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.82 0.90 0.86 0.89 0.82
Model 0.49 4.18 1.26 0.66 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.92 0.92
Sticky prices under CIA constraint can also e⁄ectively propagate non-monetary shocks. Figure
4 plots the impulse responses of output and employment to a one standard deviation technology
shock and a preference shock respectively. It shows that non-monetary shocks can also generate
hump-shaped output persistence in the model (windows A and C). This feature of the model is
worth emphasizing since it is well known that standard RBC models lack an endogenous propaga-
tion mechanism to explain the hump-shaped, trend reverting output response to transitory shocks
(Cogley and Nason, 1995, Watson, 1993). Here it is shown that sticky prices along can do the job.18
One more feature of the model to notice is that employment responds negatively to technology
shocks (see Window D in ￿gure 4). Because sticky prices and CIA constraint render aggregate
demand rigid in the short run, higher total factor productivity thus induces cost-minimizing ￿rms
to lower employment. This negative e⁄ect of technology shocks on employment as a result of sticky
prices has been empirically documented and explained by Gali (1999).19 However, in a money-in-
utility general equilibrium model, technology shocks generate positive employment even if prices
are sticky, since investment can increase to absorb the shocks.
17In￿ ation in the model behaves like an AR(1) process, indicating certain degree of persistence, but not hump-
shaped persistence. Hence the model cannot explain the well known fact that in￿ ation lags output. However, its
volatility relative to output matches the U.S. data quite well. For the issue of in￿ ation persistence and its relation
to output, see Fuhrer and Moor (1995), Ireland (2003), Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Wang and Wen (2005), among
others.
18For other mechanisms that can also generate hump-shaped output dynamics, see Wen (1998a,b,c) and Benhabib
and Wen (2004).
19Whether empirical data supports the view that technology shocks generate negative employment movements is
controversial. See Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) for a debate.
16Fig. 4. Output and Employment under Non-Monetary Shocks.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
The assumption that investment is subject to a CIA constraint is crucial in obtaining our results.
In reality, not necessarily all ￿rms￿ s investments are subject to ￿nancing constraints and hence
they may not all be tight to internal cash ￿ ows. We show here that even only as little as 30% of
aggregate investment is subject to money-in-advance constraint, aggregate output remains to be
hump-shaped.
To demonstrate, modify the CIA constraint in the model to




where   2 [0;1] measures the degree of ￿nancial constraint on aggregate investment. The model
reduces to the previous model if   = 1 and it reduces to the model of Yun (1996) and Ellision and
Scott (2000) if   = 0.
Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis
  1 0:9 0:8 0:7 0:6 0:5 0:4 0:3 0:2 0:1 0:0
Hump (at nth quarter) 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1
Half Life 10 10 10 9 9 8 7 6 5 4 2
17Table 2 shows that output remains hump-shaped and highly persistent under money shocks
even for small values of  . For example, when   = 0:6; the peak of output response is not reached
until three quarters after the shock, consistent with the U.S. data. The half life is 9 quarters, only
slightly shorter than the case of   = 1. As we reduce   further to 0:3, the half life is still 6 quarters
long and the peak of output response is still postponed beyond the impact period of the shock to
the second quarter, indicating a hump shape. Hump-shaped output disappears when   = 0:2, but
the half-life of output is still more than twice as long as the case of   = 0.20
4 Conclusion
We showed in this paper that sticky prices alone can generate strong output persistence if the cash-
in-advance constraint is extended to investment. Output exhibits a hump-shaped response pattern
even when only as little as 30% of aggregate investment is subject to a CIA constraint. In such
a model monetary shocks seem capable of explaining a broad range of business cycle facts better
than, or at least as well as, a standard RBC model driven by technology shocks. Hence whether or
not sticky prices are responsible for the business cycle is not a theoretical question, but rather an
empirical one. Given that multiple mechanisms can give rise to hump-shaped output persistence
(see, e.g., Wen 1998a, 1998b, 1998c and Benhabib and Wen 2004, among others), it remains to
empirically test which mechanism is the main culprit in propagating the business cycle in the real
world. Bills and Klenow (2003), for example, ￿nd some empirical evidence against the sticky price
propagation mechanism of monetary shocks. Baharad and Eden (2004) ￿nd that the staggered
price setting assumption is not favored by a micro data. Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (2005) and
Wang and Wen (2005) show that endogenous monetary policy, rather than sticky prices, are more
likely to be responsible for the in￿ ation dynamics found in the U.S. data. Thus, to establish sticky
prices as a key propagation mechanism of the business cycle, more empirical work is obviously
needed.
20Suppose that investment consists of two parts, I = I1 + I2, where I1 is subject to CIA constraint and I2 is






I =  . Using annual data, Worthington
(1995) found that the elasticity of investment to cash ￿ ow is between 0:2 to 0:65. The implied quarterly elasticity of
investment to cash ￿ ow should be even higher. Thus in a quarterly model,   ￿ 0:6 is a reasonably good approximation.
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